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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to contribute to the debate on the determinants of differentials in firms’ productivity. We test the 
hypothesis that macro factors, especially the quality of local institutions, play a role in explaining firm produc-
tivity in Italy. To this end, following Fӓre et al. (1994), we decompose the Malmquist index of total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) change for approximately 7,500 manufacturing small and medium-sized firms, and we proxy prov-
ince-level institutional quality using the IQI index (Nifo and Vecchione, 2014). The results of our estimations 
suggest that better local institutions might help firms better combine inputs, approach the optimal size, and ulti-
mately be more productive. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past couple of decades, considerable attention has been paid to the issue of heterogeneity 
in firms’ productivity. Researchers in many fields have offered abundant empirical evidence at-
testing the magnitude of persistent and ubiquitous productivity differentials across businesses and 
provided insight into the way firms turn inputs into outputs. While the efficiency with which this 
conversion occurs has become a topic of particular interest, the central theoretical question on the 
main determinants of the observed heterogeneity remains under debate: Why do firms differ so 
much in their abilities to convert inputs in outputs? Is productivity just a “manna from heaven” for 
the luckiest or something (or many things) more systematic? 
An interesting taxonomy of the determinants of productivity differentials is the one distinguish-
ing between internal and external factors. The former label is used for factors connected to firms’ 
features and managers’ or owners’ decisions, such as size (van Biesebroeck, 2005), industry (Sink-
konen, 2005), the adopted technology (Jorgenson et al., 2008; Bartelsman et al., 2008; Faggio et 
al., 2009), the endowment of human capital (Bandiera et al., 2007) and managerial skills (Bushnell 
and Wolfram, 2009; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010), the amount of R&D (Doraszelski and Jau-
mandreu, 2013), the degree of international openness (Wagner, 2002). The second source of inter-
firm productivity differences typically concerns the macroeconomic context in which firms oper-
ate, such as more competitive and contestable markets (Knittel, 2002; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 
2005; Brown et al., 2006; Arnold et al., 2008; Bridgam et al., 2009), a context more favourable for 
innovation (Griffith et al., 2007; Bloom et al., 2007; Bartelsman et al., 2008; Arrighetti and Lasa-
gni, 2011), inter-firm cooperation and positive spillovers (Chanda and Dalgaard, 2008; Syverson, 
2011).  
A large body of literature recognizes as a positive and important external factor the good quality 
of institutions in the geographical area where the firm is located, arguing that it enhances the ability 
of a region to capture development opportunities (OECD, 2001), a mechanism that may emerge 
through increases in local firms’ productivity. 
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When firms’ productivity differentials are evidently connected to different geographical loca-
tions, external factors, such as local institutional quality, are expected to be even more significant 
to explain the observed inter-firm diversity. The case of Italy, in this respect, looks particularly 
interesting due to the substantial and long-lasting productivity gap between industrial firms located 
in the regions of the relatively backward South vis-à-vis those in the rest of the country.  
That institutions affect economic outcomes is well established. As noted by North (1990), the 
formal and informal institutions that a given society develops (or fails to develop) are crucial in-
struments to facilitate economic growth, international investment and trade by reducing opportun-
ism in transactions among people largely unknown to one another and providing a framework for 
the creation of multilateral reputation and mutual trust. An extensive body of empirical literature 
has emphasized the role of institutions1 in affecting both input (physical and human capital) 
productivity and total factor productivity (TFP), showing the existence of a distinct direct effect of 
institutions on per capita income through TFP changes, in addition to the indirect effect through 
capital accumulation. However, all studies estimating firms’ TFP (levels and growth/ changes) are 
built on variants of Solow’s (1957) accounting technique, assuming that economic agents instan-
taneously adjust choices and behaviours to altered market conditions. If these assumptions do not 
hold, conventional estimates of TFP may be biased, and firms may be technically or allocatively 
inefficient in the use of inputs. This, in turn, implies that observed input-output combinations may 
lie below the production frontier. In such a case, TFP may change as a result of (dis)improved 
efficiency, that is, movements towards or away from the frontier. This is in stark contrast to the 
growth accounting approach, according to which observed output is equivalent to frontier output, 
and growth in TFP consists only of technological progress, that is, shifts in the frontier. Pinpointing 
                                                          
1
 Cross-country regressions have shown that institution quality is highly correlated with income per capita and that 
institutions can explain up to 30-fold per capita income differences between developed and developing countries 
(Knack and Keefer, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et. al., 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003). 
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the exact channel through which institutional quality affects firms’ productivity – i.e., whether 
institutions influence (more) the frontier or firms’ relative efficiency – may facilitate a better un-
derstanding of the determinants of inter-firm TFP heterogeneity and provide policymakers a key 
tool for helping firms become more productive and the economy to grow faster.  
This paper focuses on the effects of institutions on firms’ productivity, aiming in particular at 
evaluating the impact on TFP change exerted by institutions’ quality, which is proxied either using 
the Institutional Quality Index (IQI) proposed by Nifo and Vecchione (2014) or its single compo-
nents. Our working hypothesis is that differences in local institutional quality endowments are 
crucial in shaping inter-firm productivity differentials in the Italian industry.  
To test this hypothesis, we proceed in two steps. First, using a large sample of Italian manufac-
turing SMEs, we retrieve the dependent variables of our analysis, i.e., firms’ efficiency, by decom-
posing the Malmquist TFP index. Second, we estimate a model of the determinants of efficiency, 
where the explanatory variable of interest is either the IQI index or a single component of it. To 
account for the hierarchal structure of our data, we model firm-specific characteristics and effi-
ciency simultaneously with the higher-level geographical context, adopting a multilevel analysis. 
In the first step, we follow Färe et al. (1994), decomposing productivity growth into two mutu-
ally exclusive and exhaustive components: changes in technical efficiency and shifts in the tech-
nology frontier. The latter effect basically reflects technical innovation undertaken by firms, while 
the former represents (dis)improvements in the means by which the known technology is applied 
in production. Then, we further decompose the former component into two sub-components to 
distinguish the contribution of scale efficiency from pure efficiency changes, arising from the best 
(or worst) combination of inputs. 
In the second stage of our analysis, we provide evidence on the relationship between the en-
dowment of institutional quality in Italian provinces and the single components of firm productiv-
ity described above. A number of previous studies (Del Monte and Giannola, 1997; Scalera and 
Zazzaro, 2010; Erbetta and Petraglia, 2011; Nifo, 2011; Aiello et al., 2014) have argued that even 
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at the subnational level, productivity differences might be explained on the basis of differences in 
institutional quality. However, very few have tried to prove this relationship through an economet-
ric investigation (Lasagni et al, 2015). Furthermore, we deepen our analysis by investigating the 
relevance of five dimensions of institutional quality (regulatory quality, rule of law, government 
effectiveness, corruption, and voice and accountability) rather than of only single aspects of it, as 
is customary in the previous literature (Kneller and Misch, 2010; Daveri et al., 2011; Haggard and 
Tiede, 2011; Solinas and Jimenez, 2011). 
Our results, based on a sample of Italian manufacturing SMEs, are robust and consistent with 
most of the existing literature. We find that local institutional quality matters as it proves to be one 
driver of firms’ productivity differentials, particularly through the channel of efficiency.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the literature on macroe-
conomic factors as determinants of productivity levels, growth and differentials, and particularly 
the role of institutional quality. Section 3 illustrates the methodologies adopted. Section 4 discusses 
the results, hinging on specific robustness analysis. Section 5 summarizes the main conclusions. 
 
 
2. MACROECONOMIC DRIVERS OF FIRM PRODUCTIVITY: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The economic literature has long considered the possibility that social, historical and cultural fac-
tors, institutions and the political and administrative context may play a role in conditioning and 
steering the development processes and the economic success or decline of countries, regions and 
individual firms. Indeed, on one hand, a broad strand of literature has explored the connections 
between the recalled macroeconomic factors and the economic growth of countries and regions 
(for example, La Porta et al., 1998; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Djankov et al., 
2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004; Rodrick et al., 2004; Kwock and Tadesse, 
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2006). On the other hand, many other authors have been concerned with the influence of the mac-
roeconomic environment and, more specifically, of institutional quality on firms’ productivity. 
This section provides a short review of this latter body of literature. 
The presence of spillovers and the degree of competition are singled out by Chanda and Dal-
gaard (2008) and Syverson (2011) as the main channels through which macroeconomic factors 
may impinge on the level of business productivity. In their interpretation, spillovers basically op-
erate through incentive mechanisms: They encourage companies to innovate and to adopt new 
technologies (Nguyen et Jaramillo, 2014), to invest more in R&D (Griffith et al., 2007), to shorten 
the technology distance (Bloom et al., 2007), and to accelerate the process of convergence to the 
productivity levels of the leader in the domestic market (Bartelsman et al., 2008). Other related 
studies (Eslava et al., 2004, Bernard et al., 2006; Fernandes, 2007; Verhoogen, 2008; Bloom and 
Van Reenen, 2010) focus on the relationship between the intensity of competition and productivity. 
Greater competition allows the best companies to gain larger market shares at the expense of less 
efficient firms, according to the so-called “Darwinian selection of the market”. Moreover, compe-
tition creates greater opportunities for comparing performance, making it easier for owners to mon-
itor managers (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). In addition, improvements 
in productivity may generate higher revenues and profits in a more competitive environment, 
where the price elasticity of demand tends to be higher, and because more competition is likely to 
raise the likelihood of bankruptcy at any given level of managerial effort, managers have to work 
harder to avoid this outcome (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). An additional effect of stronger compe-
tition on firms’ productivity may stem from the increased incentive for workers, provided that 
product market rents are shared with workers in the form of higher wages or reduced effort (Haskel 
and Sanchis, 1995). Another strand of studies focuses on the relationship between the inten-
sity/quality of market regulation and productivity. In this view, poor or inadequate regulations can 
create perverse incentives that reduce productivity (Bridgam et al., 2009). By contrast, largely pos-
itive effects can be associated with the implementation of an incentive programme combining the 
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gains of economic operators to obtain particular standards of operational efficiency (Knittel, 2002), 
similar to those of the programmes of product market regulations in OECD countries (Nicoletti 
and Scarpetta, 2005, Arnold et al., 2008) or privatization programmes in Eastern European coun-
tries (Brown et al., 2006). 
Regarding more specifically the role of institutions, at least since the work of North (1990, p. 
3), for whom “institutions are the rules of the game in a society”, institutions have been acknowl-
edged to crucially contribute to forming the set of incentives underlying behaviour and individual 
choices. The importance of institutional quality as a basic determinant of economic growth and 
TFP in the long term has been illustrated by many authors. The seminal paper by Hall and Jones 
(1999), for example, emphasizes the effects of the history of a people and the underlying institu-
tional structures on countries’ economic performance. Mankiw et al. (1992) highlight the im-
portance of the impact of institutions on investment in human and physical capital and thus on per 
capita income. In the same vein, Eicher et al. (2006) and Ketterer and Rodriguez-Pose (2012) note 
that institutions have a large impact on human and physical capital accumulation, which in turn 
affects firms’ productivity. In particular, Rodrik et al. (2004) highlight the important role that in-
stitutions play in preventing the expropriability of property. 
Following Hall and Jones (1999), other contributions (Kaufman et al., 1999; Acemoglu, et al., 
2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Grigorian and Martinez, 2002; Rodrik et al., 2004) note that in 
addition to affecting capital accumulation, institutions may affect firms’ TFP and output through 
other channels. For example, McGuinness (2007), Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), Chanda and 
Dalgaard (2008) show how better institutions create a favourable business environment and a legal 
structure that directs investments towards activities able to ensure higher and more rapid economic 
growth. Good institutions encourage firms to use better technology, invest in knowledge creation 
and transfer (Loayza et al., 2005), produce on a larger scale and operate with a long time horizon, 
with a positive impact on competitiveness and economic performance (Aron, 2000), thereby en-
suring higher levels of efficiency and often a fairer distribution of income (Bowen and De Clercq, 
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2008). Many other studies, both for cross-country (Barro and Lee, 1993; Nugent, 1993; Mauro, 
1995; World Bank, 1997; Brunetti, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Djankov et al., 2002) and inter-
regional comparisons (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Helliwell and Putnam, 1995; Arrighetti and 
Serravalli, 1999; Dall’Aglio, 1999), have found evidence of significant correlations between 
measures of institutional quality and various indicators of economic performance.  
Regarding the specific case of Italy, many observers have explained the economic divide be-
tween the Northern and Southern regions with reference to the different regional endowments of 
institutional quality. For example, Di Liberto and Sideri (2015) find evidence of the significant 
role of past regional domination (i.e., rule over different areas from the 12th to 18th centuries) on 
the current regional public administration performance, further supporting the idea that old norms 
and institutions tend to persist over centuries, strongly conditioning the economic performance of 
Italian regions and explaining a significant part of the observed gap in regional productivity levels. 
In the same vein, Nifo (2011), Aiello et al. (2014) and Lasagni et al. (2015) and ascribe a crucial 
role to macroeconomic factors in accounting for the significant and persistent productivity disper-
sion across Italian firms. In particular, concerning institutions, Del Monte and Giannola (1997) 
claim that institutional factors have contributed to creating an unfavourable business environment; 
Scalera and Zazzaro (2010) argue that public policies have been undermined by a poor institutional 
context; and Erbetta and Petraglia (2011) emphasize the crucial role of institutions and public cap-
ital in determining Italian firms’ productivity differentials.  
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
To verify the influence of institutional quality on firms’ efficiency, our analysis is organized into 
two steps, similarly to a large number of other contributions investigating the impact of internal 
firm characteristics and external factors on DEA efficiency estimates or Malmquist indices (e.g., 
Alvarez and Crespi, 2003; Ariff and Can, 2008; Sufian, 2009; Cummins et al., 2010; Cummins 
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and Xie, 2013). First, we retrieve our dependent variables (firms’ efficiency) by decomposing the 
Malmquist TFP index. To allow different technologies in different sectors, we carry out separate 
computations at the 2-digit level of the ATECO classification. Second, we estimate a model of the 
determinants of firms’ productivity, where the explanatory variable of interest is institutional qual-
ity defined at the provincial level. To account for the hierarchical structure of our data, we adopt a 
mixed estimator.  
Before describing these steps in more detail, it is worth mentioning that Banker and Natarajan 
(2008) and Johnson and Kuosmanen (2012) show that the two-stage DEA estimator is statistically 
consistent under different conditions, providing theoretical justification for its use. Furthermore, 
“Unlike the regression methods such as stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), the DEA efficiency 
estimator is not subject to the omitted variable bias in the first stage if the effect of the contextual 
variables has a finite maximum and the sample size is sufficiently large” (Johnson and Kuosmanen, 
2012, page 560). Because our estimation sample is large, in light of the considerations above, we 
adopt a two-stage DEA estimator. 
 
3.1 First stage: The Malmquist productivity index decomposition 
Following Färe et al. (1994), we compute (total) productivity change as the geometric mean of two 
output-oriented Malmquist productivity indexes.2 These indexes, proposed by Caves et al. (1982), 
are based on the Malmquist (output) distance functions. Thus, we first define the latter and then 
illustrate the Malmquist TFP index.  
                                                          
2
 Several empirical works adopt the same measure of productivity change. An output orientation is commonly adopted 
when it is fair to assume that firms seek to maximize output for given input combinations (as in the manufacturing 
case; see, for instance, Milana et al., 2013). By contrast, when producers have a statutory obligation to meet demand, 
and they also have to guarantee certain quality levels, it is proper to assume that firms attempt to minimize input for 
given output levels (see Saal et al., 2007, for water and sewerage services and Giuffrida, 1999, for primary care provi-
sion by Family Health Service Authorities). 
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Distance functions, which may be either output or input oriented, allow the measurement of 
firms’ efficiency without imposing any assumptions on firm behaviour, such as profit maximiza-
tion or cost minimization. The basic idea underlying the notion of distance is that at any point in 
time, we can draw a production frontier, i.e., a locus of technically efficient input-output combina-
tions, given the existing technology. Hence, the distance between this frontier and a given combi-
nation beneath the frontier can be regarded as a measure of technical inefficiency. More formally, 
an output distance function gauges the largest proportional expansion of the output vector, condi-
tional on given input levels.3 In other words, “we could think of deflating the output vector so that 
the resulting deflated output vector is just producible by the input vector x” (Diewert and Fox, 
2010, page 76). Hence, an output distance function, in period t, may be defined as follows: 
 ��ሺ��, ݔ�ሻ = ݉�݊{ߜ: ሺ�/ߜሻ ∊ �ሺݔሻ}               (1) 
 
where P(x) is the production possibilities set for the technology available in period t. The minimum 
value of parameter δ is equal to unity for all combinations on the frontier (when production is 
technically efficient, in Farrell’s [1957] terminology), while it is lower than one for all other com-
binations belonging to production set P(x). Having specified the distance function (1), it is possible 
to measure the productivity change from a given period to another (say, from t=0 to t=1) by com-
puting the ratio between two distances as follows:  
 ݉�ሺ�଴, �ଵ, ݔ଴, ݔଵሻ = ��ೃೄ� ሺ�భ,�భሻ��ೃೄ� ሺ�బ,�బሻ               (2) 
 
where both distance functions are defined relatively to the same (constant returns to scale, CRS) 
benchmark technology prevailing in period t. Because in our exemplification, t may be either 0 or 
1, it is possible to compute two ratios (i.e., two Malmquist indexes). To avoid selecting an arbitrary 
                                                          
3
 An input distance function provides the largest proportional contraction of the inputs, given an output vector. Both 
concepts allow the complete categorization of the technology, and when constant returns to scale prevail, the input 
distance function is the reciprocal of the output distance function.  
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reference technology, the two indexes may be combined, as suggested by Färe et al. (1994), by 
computing the following geometric mean: 
 ݉ሺ�଴, �ଵ, ݔ଴, ݔଵሻ = √ሺ݉଴݉ଵሻ = √��ೃೄబ ሺ�భ,�భሻ��ೃೄబ ሺ�బ,�బሻ ��ೃೄభ ሺ�భ,�భሻ��ೃೄభ ሺ�బ,�బሻ            (3) 
 
Hence, to retrieve the output-oriented Malmquist index (3), we need to calculate four distance 
functions, which requires knowledge of the production technologies in the two time periods. The 
main approaches applied to estimate production frontiers and thus firms’ inefficiency measures are 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).4 In this study we adopt 
the DEA approach because it does not require any a priori hypotheses on the frontier functional 
form or on the distribution of the regression error terms. Furthermore, several contributions suggest 
that the two methodologies tend to yield consistent results (Cummins and Zi, 1998; Casu et. al., 
2004; Din et al. 2007; Elling and Luhnen, 2010; Cummins and Xie, 2013; Milana et al., 2013).  
In applying the DEA approach, we adopt the conventional notation, indicating with N the num-
ber of firms (or decision making units, DMUs) belonging to each sector. If the ith firm employs K 
inputs to produce M outputs (represented by vectors xi and qi, respectively), the (K×N) input ma-
trix, X, and the (M×N) output matrix, Q, represent the data of all N firms in each sector. Assuming 
constant returns to scale, the general linear programming problem that has to be solved for each 
firm is: 
 
maxλ,ϕ  ϕ      s. t.:  Qλ-ϕqi  ≥0;   Xi-Xλ ≥ 0;   λ ≥ 0             (4) 
 
                                                          
4
 While DEA is a linear programming-based methodology (introduced by Charnes et al., 1978) providing non-para-
metric measures of efficiency relative to the sample employed, SFA is an econometric method based on the assumption 
of a specific production function (typically a Cobb-Douglas or a Translog function) generating absolute measures of 
efficiency (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and Broeck, 1977). For a more detailed description of these two methodolo-
gies, we refer to Coelli et al. (2005). 
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where ϕ is a scalar, and λ is an N*1 vector of constants. Optimal value ϕ* is the efficiency score 
for the ith firm, which is greater than or equal to unity, with a value of 1 corresponding to a point 
on the frontier. Recalling that Farrell’s (1957) output-based measure of technical efficiency is re-
ciprocal to the output distance function (Färe et al., 1994), it is possible to retrieve [��ሺ��, ݔ�ሻ]= 
ϕ*-1. Therefore, the four distance functions that enter the Malmquist index are obtained by solving 
four linear programmes. Two of them are obtained considering both the technology and input-
output combination from the same period. The other two letting the reference technology to be 
constructed from data in one period, whereas the input-output combination is from the other period. 
After outlining how the Malmquist index is retrieved, it is crucial to remark that TFP changes, 
gauged by the index, can be driven not only by improvements in technical efficiency (moving 
closer to the production frontier) but also by outward shifts of the technology frontier (technolog-
ical progress) and movements along the frontier (returns to scale). Therefore, as proposed by Färe 
et al. (1994), we decompose the Malmquist index into three components: pure technical efficiency 
change (PEFF), technological change (TECH), and scale efficiency change (SE).5 Formally, 
 
m(q0 q1, x0 x1)= PEFF *TECH * SE              (5) 
 
A value of PEFF greater than 1 indicates efficiency progress, indicating that the firm is catching 
up to the best-practice frontier (i.e., it is closer to the frontier in period 1 than it was in period 0). 
On the other hand, a value lower than 1 signals efficiency regress. Analogous considerations apply 
to the other TFP change components. Finally, to obtain decomposition (5), one needs to compute 
                                                          
5
 The literature presents different approaches, based on different assumptions, for decomposing the Malmquist index. 
For instance, Ray and Desli (1997) criticize Färe et al. (1994) and advocate for an alternative decomposition, where 
the pure technical efficiency change term is the same, but the other two terms are differently computed. We refer to 
Balk (2001), Lovell (2003) and Pastor et al. (2011) for a review of the different decompositions.  
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additional distance functions, using a variable returns to scale (VRS) reference technology 
[��ோௌ଴ ሺ�଴, ݔ଴ሻ;  ��ோௌଵ ሺ�ଵ, ݔଵሻ].6 
 
3.2 Second stage: the determinants of firms’ efficiency 
In this section, we empirically investigate the impact of institutional quality on different compo-
nents of firm efficiency, controlling for individual firm characteristics and other contextual varia-
bles conditioning firms’ performance. 
As section 2 above highlights, underlying our empirical question is the idea that firms’ effi-
ciency may depend not only on internal firms’ characteristics and capabilities but also, crucially, 
on the environment within which firms operate (Fazio and Piacentino, 2010; Raspe and Van Oort, 
2011; Nerozzi et al., 2015; Aiello and Ricotta 2016). As examples, recent research on the geogra-
phy of innovation highlights that: “spatial concentration of relevant actors, their interactions, and 
other environmental factors conducive to learning determine the propensity of firms to generate 
innovations as much as their individual characteristics, resources, and capabilities” (Srholec, 2010, 
page 1210). More generally, studies investigating the determinants of firms’ performance and sur-
vival highlight the remarkable importance of regional conditions, such as the access to specialized 
services and differentiated job markets and the proximity to a large number of suppliers, consumers 
and research centres (Vernon Henderson et al., 2001; Fritsch et al., 2006; Falck, 2007, Ottaviano, 
2008). In this work, we argue that contextual effects, particularly the institutional quality effects 
on which we focus, may influence all components of efficiency: the ability of firms to organize 
their inputs, their propensity to innovate and their capacity to reach their optimal scale of produc-
tion.  
                                                          
6
 The overall efficiency change component (EFFCH=SE x PEFF) is calculated under constant returns to scale, while 
SE is the ratio of the scale efficiency measures in the two periods (scale efficiency in each period being the ratio 
between the distance function from a VRS frontier and the distance function from the CRS frontier). 
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Since different drivers of firms’ efficiency operate at different levels, we need to adopt a tech-
nique that takes into account the hierarchal structure of the data and relates a dependent variable 
to explanatory variables defined at different levels. Hence, we model firm-specific characteristics 
and efficiency simultaneously with the higher-level geographical context, adopting a multilevel 
analysis. Multilevel (or mixed-effects) models have been widely adopted in social and medical 
sciences when handling hierarchical or clustered data to overcome some methodological limita-
tions of the traditional single-equation models, based on the restrictive assumption of independence 
among errors.7 As an example, in medical research, patients can be clustered in hospitals, while in 
educational research, pupils can be nested within classes and schools. Furthermore, in economic 
research, firms can be nested within geographical areas (such as regions or provinces) or produc-
tive sectors. Neglecting clusters leads to inference problems because the estimated parameter var-
iance will be underestimated, entailing a higher probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when 
it is, in fact, true (Hox, 2013).8 
Multilevel models allow correlation among the residuals of observations belonging to the same 
cluster, yielding more efficient estimates. Furthermore, hierarchical models allow deepening the 
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation, capturing the complexity characterizing the 
real world. In our study, they allow properly investigating the influence of specific provincial char-
acteristics on firm efficiency. In other words, we can gauge the influence of specific higher-level 
factors (such as the provincial institutional quality) and the interplay between micro and macro 
determinants of firms’ performance. Indeed, multilevel models are increasingly applied by re-
search investigating the determinants of firms’ performance to account for micro-and macro-level 
                                                          
7
 For a more detailed illustration of the multilevel approach, we refer to De Leeuw and Meijer (2008). 
8
 On the other hand, considering clusters (regions or sectors) as statistical units may entail the so-called “ecological 
fallacy” (Robinson, 1950) because correlations that are valid at the aggregated level do not necessarily hold true at the 
individual level.  
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heterogeneity and interrelationships (Fazio and Piacentino, 2010; van Oort et al. 2012; Nerozzi et 
al., 2015; Aiello and Ricotta 2016). 
In our sample, firms represent level one units, clustered within administrative provinces, which 
represent the second level. Formally, a baseline equation for level one can be written as: 
 ݕ௜௝ = ߚ଴௝ + ߚଵ௝ݔ௜௝ + ߝ௜௝                (6) 
 
where i refers to firms, and j refers to provinces; y is a measure of efficiency, and x is an explanatory 
variable defined at the first level of analysis. At level two, both intercept ߚ଴௝ and coefficient ߚଵ௝ 
may be modelled to allow random components defined at the provincial level: 
  ߚ଴௝ = ߛ଴଴ + �଴௝   ߚଵ௝ = ߛଵ଴ + �ଵ௝                 (7) 
 
where ߛ଴଴ and ߛଵ଴are second-level means, and e0j and e1j are normally distributed random effects. 
Embedding model (7) in equation (6) yields a mixed equation: 
 ݕ௜௝ = ߛ଴଴ + ߛଵ଴ݔ௜௝ + (�଴௝ + �ଵ௝ݔ௜௝ + ߝ௜௝)               (8) 
 
where the dependent variables are explained by a deterministic part and a stochastic part, in paren-
theses, which accounts for the hierarchical structure of data. 
To specify model (8), we build on a large body of research that has investigated the determinants 
of firms’ efficiency, suggesting the interplay of firms’ characteristics and external factors. Among 
the most investigated and established determinants are firm size, age, ownership structure, labour 
quality, export orientation, access to credit and market competitive pressure (Caves and Barton, 
1990; Caves, 1992; Frydman et al., 1999; Aw et al., 2000; Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Alvarez 
and Crespi, 2003; Sinani et al., 2007). In what follows, we briefly illustrate the determinants of 
firm efficiency, which enter our estimating equation as controls, along with our key variable (IQI). 
It is worth noting from the outset that our choices have been inevitably conditioned by data avail-
ability. 
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Considering firm-level characteristics, firm size, age, indebtedness and liquidity are taken into 
account. Since the AIDA database does not provide information on importing/exporting activity, 
on the quality of labour or on credit rationing, size and age are bound also to proxy for these factors. 
Indeed, the size control (SIZE) may capture not only economies of specialization resulting from 
larger dimensions but also other potential effects of size on the ability of firms to successfully 
manage their input combinations. For instance, larger firms may have better access to finance, 
attract employees with higher skills, and be more export oriented and thus more exposed to inter-
national competition and “learning by exporting” effects. To gauge non-linear effects, we also 
include the squared term of SIZE. As far as age is concerned (AGE), older firms might exploit 
“learning by doing” effects and be more able to access credit, given their longer records. On the 
other hand, younger enterprises may be more motivated to build their reputation, more inclined to 
internationalization and more capable of absorbing new technological knowledge. Furthermore, 
firms’ indebtedness (INDEBT) may have contrasting effects on efficiency. Indeed, greater liquid-
ity may smooth the production process, helping firms optimally utilize their productive capacity. 
However, debt may also entail agency costs as shareholders can behave opportunistically, at the 
expense of debt holders, by making decisions that do not necessarily enhance firm value or effi-
ciency.9 Additionally, soft-budget constraint problems may arise when banks or suppliers keep 
financing customers even when undertaking inefficient projects to avoid their default and recuper-
ate past loans (Carletti, 2004). Finally, liquidity (CASHFLOW) should enhance firms’ capability 
to optimally manage their production process, decreasing the completion time of projects (and 
hence their relative costs). 
                                                          
9
 We do not emphasize organization inefficiencies due to agency costs connected to the separation between ownership 
and control (Jensen,1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) because they may be largely negligible for Italian SMEs, fea-
turing a strongly concentrated ownership structure (e.g., Giacomelli and Trento, 2005; Costi and Messori, 2005). 
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The provincial characteristics for which we control are local development (provincial per capita 
gross domestic product, GDPPC), agglomeration economies (population density, DENSITY), di-
versification economies (Jacob index, JACOB, defined as the number of sectors in each province, 
with more than 10 firms), local generation and diffusion of knowledge (patent applications, PA-
TENT, and research and development expenditure, R&D). All these provincial variables are ex-
pected to positively affect firms’ efficiency. 
Moreover, we control for the degree of industry concentration (proxied using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, HHI, based either on sales or total assets), as higher competitive pressure should 
stimulate firms’ efficiency.10 
Finally, we limit potential simultaneity bias by assuming the lagged values of all regressors. We 
also control for level 2 endogeneity adopting the Mundlack (1978) correction (see section 4). 
 
3.3 Data  
Our estimations are based on data drawn from the Bureau Van Dijk AIDA database, which pro-
vides balance sheet information on Italian firms belonging to all productive sectors, and the Italian 
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). Our analysis considers all Italian manufacturing sectors, 
with the exception of the tobacco industry, characterized by too few observations. Table 1 shows 
the summary statistics of the variables employed to retrieve our measure of technical efficiency 
for a sample of 7,766 firms observed over 9 years (from 2004 to 2012). The nominal values of 
output (total sales) and inputs (capital assets, personnel costs and raw materials costs) have been 
                                                          
10
 Higher HHI values are not necessarily synonymous with lower competition in an industrial sector. Indeed, while 
according to the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, concentration may foster collusive behaviour among firms 
and therefore a reduction in the degree of competition, the Efficient-Structure Hypothesis claims that a greater concen-
tration emerges as a consequence of higher competition in the market, as the most efficient firms might increase their 
market shares at the expense of their less efficient competitors. 
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deflated by means of (sector and output/input-specific) deflators, which are available for Italy in 
the OECD database (ISIC Revision 4, base-year 2005). 
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
To compute the Malmquist index described above, a balanced data panel is required. Hence, 
our results are conditional on firms’ survival.11 Further, to rule out potential outliers, all variables’ 
distributions have been trimmed, excluding observations belonging to the top and bottom 1%.  
Table 1 also presents summary statistics concerning the variables entering our efficiency model 
determinants. The IQI index, the focus of our analysis, is built by Nifo and Vecchione (2014) on a 
yearly basis, at the provincial (NUTS3) level. Inspired by the WGI framework (Kaufmann et al., 
2011), it derives from the aggregation of 5 indexes of a lower rank and is constructed following 
the hierarchy framework illustrated in Figure 1.12 
 
 [FIGURE 1] 
 
Each item of the IQI will be further described in section 4 when investigating the relationship 
between TFP change and each institutional dimension. 
 
[TABLE 2] 
 
                                                          
11
 When sample is limited, rather than excluding decision units with incomplete observations, some authors resort to 
interpolation (Giuffrida, 1999) or a “fake unit” approach (Yang and Pollitt, 2012). In the present analysis, we prefer to 
avoid potential measurement errors (to which the DEA approach is particularly sensitive) as the number of observations 
available is large.  
12
 The IQI index is also available at the regional (NUTS2) level. The full dataset can be downloaded at: 
sites.google.com/site/institutionalqualityindex/home. 
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Table 2 reports the average values of the IQI index and the Malmquist index components by 
province in the period 2004-2011. Provinces are sorted in ascending order of IQI; thus, the institu-
tional quality divide between the country’s North and South clearly emerges. Indeed, the lowest 
(22) IQI scores are associated with Southern provinces, and vice-versa, the highest (30) ones refer 
to the provinces located in Central and Northern Italy. Furthermore, most provinces occupying 
panel A of Table 2 (i.e., those characterized by lower IQI values) tend to display a decline in terms 
of TFP, which seems mainly determined by a lack of gains in pure efficiency. By contrast, most 
provinces displaying higher IQI levels (panel B) appear characterized by progress in terms of TFP, 
which seems mainly driven by positive technological change and pure efficiency change. To fur-
ther explore the relationship between the variables of interest across the provinces, Figures 2-5 
report the mean values of the IQI index and one Malmquist component at a time, both computed 
at the province level. A positive association with institutional quality seems to characterize all 
components, except the scale efficiency change. 
 
[FIGURES 2-5] 
 
 
 
4. RESULTS 
The estimation outcomes of our benchmark model are reported in columns 1 to 4 of Table 3. Look-
ing first at the control variables, we find a non-linear relationship between SIZE and firms’ effi-
ciency; it is U-shaped for TFP and PEFF (and for TECH, but not statistically significantly) and 
inverse U-shaped for SE. This evidence seems to indicate that beyond a size threshold, firms’ di-
mension positively impacts TFP. The estimated coefficients of AGE turn out to be negative and 
statistically significant in the TFP and PEFF cases, suggesting that total efficiency decreases as 
firms become older and that this effect is driven by negative changes in pure efficiency. Concern-
ing the two financial variables, INDEBT and CASHFLOW, the results seem to be in line with the 
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view that higher liquidity may facilitate firms’ management of their production process. Indeed, 
the estimated coefficients of both regressors are always positive and mostly statistically significant. 
At the provincial level, we find that agglomeration (DENSITY) and diversification economies 
(JACOB) may play a role in favouring firms’ total and scale efficiency (DENSITY is also positive 
and statistically significant in the PEFF regression). Finally, the coefficients of GDPPC and PA-
TENT appear to be significant only once, in the pure efficiency and the scale efficiency cases, 
respectively. 
Focusing on the main variable of interest, i.e., IQI, the first column of Table 3 provides support 
for our research hypothesis: the estimated coefficient of our proxy of institutional quality is positive 
and statistically significant in the TFP regression. When IQI increases by 10%, the TFP change 
increases, on average, by 4.6%. 
 Furthermore, the figures in columns from 2 to 4 suggest that the influence of IQI on firms’ total 
efficiency is determined mainly by the impact of institutional quality on firms’ pure efficiency 
(0.309) and, at a lower magnitude, by the effect on scale efficiency (0.164). 
Our main findings remain qualitatively unaltered when we perform several robustness checks. 
First, we modify the benchmark specification by adding the square of AGE (Table 3, columns 5-
8) or inserting a dummy for the recent crisis years (Table 3, columns 9-12). Furthermore, we 
change the estimation technique by adopting a random coefficient model rather than a random 
intercept model (Table 3, columns 13-16). Finally, as suggested by Snijders and Berkhof (2007), 
we control for cross-level endogeneity (between the level 2 error terms and the level 1 regressors) 
adopting Mundlak’s (1978) correction, i.e., we add to the benchmark model the provincial means 
of the firm-level explanatory variables (Table 3, columns 17-20). 
 
 [TABLE 3] 
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4.1 Which institutional quality dimension drives our findings? 
To provide more insight, we investigate the relevance of each dimension of institutional quality 
encompassed in the overall IQI index: the degree of corruption of those performing public func-
tions in terms of both illegal gains and private proceeds acquired to the detriment of society (Con-
trol and Corruption, CORR); the quality of public service and the policies formulated and imple-
mented by the local government (Government Effectiveness, GOV); the ability of government to 
promote and formulate effective regulatory interventions (Regulatory Quality, REG); the degree 
of legal certainty, in terms of contract fulfilment, property rights, incidence of crime, tax evasion, 
shadow economy, law enforcement and effectiveness in the administration of justice (Rule of Law, 
RUL); and the degree of freedom of press and association (Voice and Accountability, VOI).   
Each of these facets of institutional quality has been separately analysed by the literature. The 
relationship between corruption and regional or national productivity has long been discussed from 
both theoretical (Krueger 1974; Rose-Ackerman 1978; Baumol 1990; Acemoglu and Verdier, 
2000) and empirical perspectives (Méon and Sekkat, 2005; del Mar Salinas-Jiménez and Salinas-
Jiménez, 2011). While the specific relationship between corruption and firm productivity remains 
almost unexplored (a relevant exception being De Rosa et al., 2010), both theory and empirical 
evidence highlight the negative consequences of corruption for resource allocation, entrepreneur-
ship, investment and innovation (Baumol, 1990). Other studies emphasize how the entry of new 
firms is made more difficult in the presence of greater corruption and larger unofficial economies 
(Djankov et al., 2002); how investment decisions are discouraged by de facto entry barriers into 
otherwise competitive markets (Alesina et al., 2005); and how corruption directly affects the 
sources of productivity enhancements, technological progress and investment (Krusell and Rios-
Rull, 1996; Svensson, 2005).  
Concerning the issue of “Government Effectiveness”, some studies have highlighted the impact 
of the history of peoples and the connected institutional structures on the economic performance 
of countries (Hall and Jones, 1999), focusing, for example, on the role of political institutions in 
22 
 
steering entrepreneurial efforts towards more productive activities and supporting business 
(Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991). Arrighetti and Lasagni (2011) argue that private firms are 
more abler to innovate and to push technological change where the intermediate government bod-
ies (local political and administrative institutions) play a more active and positive role, also influ-
encing firms’ productivity. More effective public policies in health, transport and education 
(Kneller and Misch, 2010), transport (Shirley and Winston, 2004; Datta, 2008), and public elec-
tricity services (Reinkka and Svensson, 2002) are found to positively affect firms’ productivity. 
Regarding “Regulatory Quality”, other contributions show the positive impact of liberalization 
and privatization policies in the OECD area on productivity in all sectors (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 
2005) and document the negative relationship between entry barriers and services’ productivity in 
France and Italy (Daveri et al., 2011). An investigation of micro data from Bangladesh, China, 
India and Pakistan (Dollar et al., 2003) shows that the impact of the investment climate on firms’ 
TFP is systematically positively related to the “Regulatory Quality” indicators. 
Theoretical and empirical literature widely acknowledges the role of “Rule of Law” in fostering eco-
nomic development and firms’ performance. It discusses the negative effects of crime on the course of 
economic development (Ayres, 1998; Buvinic and Morrison, 2000); the negative correlations between 
the homicide rate and the increase in per capita GDP (World Bank, 2006) and between premature adult 
mortality from all sources, including crime, and the profound effect on time horizons, investment, and 
economic activity (Lorentzen et. al, 2008); the positive correlation between court efficiency across pro-
vincial courts and greater access to credit, showing that “larger more efficient firms are found in states 
with better court systems”, leading to the conclusion that better courts “increase the firms’ willingness to 
invest more” (Dam, 2006); evidence of a positive correlation between the efficiency of the Mexican court 
systems and faster growth of small firms (Islam, 2003). This view holds that the economic environ-
ment and firms’ performance depend upon a legal system in which contracts between private 
parties are enforced, the property rights of foreign and domestic investors are respected, and the 
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executive and legislative branches of government operate within a known framework of rules 
(World Bank 1992, 1994, 1997; Sherwood 1995; Shihata 1995; Dakolias 1996;).  
In the literature on institutional quality, there is a large number of contributions on institutional 
thickness (Amin and Thrift, 1994) and social capital (Putnam, 1993a; Narayan and Pritchett, 1997; 
Woolcock, 1998). Both of these concepts are connected to a wide combination of factors, including 
the presence of virtuous local institutions and inter-institutional links that can create a sharing cul-
ture and a set of values that help construct the so-called “social atmosphere”, generate mutual trust, 
enhance innovative capacity, expand common knowledge and strengthen local economic activity. 
Empirical evidence has clarified the roles social cohesion (Rodrik, 1997; Ritzen et al., 2000) and 
the spread of collaborative and associative practices (Putnam, 1993a and 1993b; Narayan, 1999) 
may have as drivers of economic development, showing that growth is favoured by greater social 
peace, political stability and a better quality of institutions and public services. The item “Voice 
and Accountability” of IQI fits into the debate on social capital à la Putnam while representing a 
dimension of social capital that is more consistent with the focus of the present work: a fair picture 
of the degree of citizens’ participation in social and public life, represented by their willingness to 
act as volunteers, the presence of non-profit organizations and social cooperatives, and the number 
of books published. The literature focused on the relationship between social participation and firm 
performance suggests that knowledge flows are geographically bound as they tend to stream 
through social networks (Sorenson, 2003; Powell and Owen-Smith, 2004; Tallman et al., 2004).  
According to our estimates, reported by Table 4, RUL is always positive and significant, except 
in the technological change case, while REG is significant only in the TFP change case. Thus, 
institutional contexts characterized by a relatively high incidence of crime, tax evasion, shadow 
economy, poor law enforcement and higher judicial costs seem to negatively affect firms’ pure 
technical efficiency and scale efficiency. 
 
 [TABLE 4] 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Using a large sample of Italian manufacturing SMEs observed from 2004 to 2012, this paper in-
vestigates the relationship between institutional quality, defined at the province level, and firms’ 
TFP growth, which is disentangled into three components: technological, pure technical efficiency 
and scale efficiency change. 
Controlling for both firms’ characteristics and contextual effects in a hierarchical model, we 
find that better institutions seem to favour a more efficient use of inputs by firms and stimulate the 
adoption of an operational scale more suitable to obtain good productivity performances. On the 
other hand, institutional quality never turns out to affect technological change, i.e., the capacity of 
firms to generate innovations. 
Additionally, according to our findings, the most relevant institutional dimension is the one 
summarizing aspects related to legal certainty. In other words, institutional contexts characterized 
by a relatively low incidence of crime, good law enforcement and higher effectiveness in the ad-
ministration of justice seem to positively influence firms’ capacity to move both towards the bench-
mark frontier and towards the optimal productivity scale. 
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VARIABLE Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
TOTREV (a) 9,843 7394 3.28 45,031 69,894
KAP (a) 2,748 2720 0.09 15,007 69,894
RAWM (a) 734 814 0.07 5,440 69,894
EMPLO (a) 1,579 1156 0.02 6,081 69,894
TFP 1.42 1.36 0.13 8.31 58,667
TECH 1.04 0.23 0.60 1.79 58,667
SE 1.18 0.79 0.20 4.78 58,667
PEFF 1.40 1.27 0.14 7.55 58,667
IQI 0.70 0.13 0.00 1.00 56,631
CORR 0.87 0.13 0.20 0.99 56,631
GOV 0.46 0.10 0.06 0.65 56,631
REG 0.58 0.12 0.10 0.93 56,631
RUL 0.56 0.12 0.13 0.86 56,631
VOI 0.52 0.13 0.15 0.70 56,631
SIZE (a) 10,164 7334 401 35,109 58,667
AGE (b) 45.50 29.23 8.00 112.0 58,659
INDEBT (c) 58.47 20.63 10.93 94.09 58,667
CASHFLOW (c) 5.72 -5.91 12.01 26.30 58,667
GDPPC (a) 30.59 7.40 11.81 49.43 49,261
DENSITY 504.9 597.1 31.0 2,603 58,667
HHI 0.05 0.09 0.01 1.00 58,667
JACOB 12.09 10.46 0.00 23.00 58,667
PATENT 127.4 68.30 0.25 487.8 58,569
R&D 360.8 116.2 58.50 656.9 51,399
Technological change
Scale efficiency change
Total intramural R&D expenditure (Euros per inhabitant)
Total assets
Current year minus firm’s year of establishment 
Total debt to total assets
Firm's cashflow
Pure technical efficiency change
Government effectiveness - IQI dimension
(a) in thousands of Euro; (b) in years; (c) in percentage
Herfindahl-Hirschman index on firms' assets
Jacob index: number of sectors (2-digit level) in each province, with more than 10 firms
Patent applications (per million inhabitants) to the EPO by priority year by NUTS 3 regions 
Provincial IQI (Instituional quality index)
Provincial per capita GDP
Provincial population/provincial surface (sq. km)
Voice and accountability - IQI dimension
Regulatory quality - IQI dimension
Rule of law - IQI dimension
Corruption - IQI dimension
Malmquist index, TFP change
Entering the second stage model 
Expenditure for raw materials
Personnel expenditure
TABLE 1 -  Description and summary statistics
DESCRIPTION
Employed to retrieve the Malmquist index 
Total revenue
Tangible plus intangible assets (including depreciation)
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Province Region TFP TECH SE PEFF IQI Province Region TFP TECH SE PEFF IQI
Crotone Calabria 0.584 0.963 0.765 0.746 0.003 Terni Umbria 0.860 1.034 0.863 0.962 0.670
Vibo Valentia Calabria 0.663 0.989 0.894 0.767 0.071 Macerata Marche 0.836 1.019 0.885 0.926 0.675
Catanzaro Calabria 0.632 0.988 0.950 0.678 0.088 Modena Emilia-Romagna 1.125 1.021 0.946 1.155 0.676
Reggio di Calabria Calabria 0.839 0.986 0.771 1.105 0.145 Lodi Lombardia 1.139 1.009 1.013 1.116 0.678
Caltanissetta Sicilia 0.879 1.009 1.164 0.722 0.149 Sondrio Lombardia 0.888 0.990 0.835 1.050 0.683
Cosenza Calabria 0.537 0.968 0.948 0.586 0.182 Vicenza Veneto 0.992 1.018 0.922 1.055 0.685
Agrigento Sicilia 0.709 0.972 1.119 0.650 0.191 Asti Piemonte 0.959 1.017 0.888 1.065 0.689
Trapani Sicilia 0.743 0.993 1.007 0.761 0.215 Bologna Emilia-Romagna 1.030 1.017 1.005 1.005 0.689
Isernia Molise 0.855 1.011 1.046 0.817 0.234 Roma Lazio 1.104 1.011 0.967 1.125 0.696
Enna Sicilia 0.672 1.105 1.183 0.507 0.239 Venezia Veneto 1.007 1.014 0.998 0.994 0.697
Palermo Sicilia 0.743 0.992 0.942 0.796 0.262 Como Lombardia 0.928 1.021 0.870 1.046 0.697
Catania Sicilia 0.786 0.980 1.217 0.654 0.263 Perugia Umbria 0.940 1.021 1.001 0.918 0.700
Napoli Campania 0.942 1.013 0.953 0.984 0.263 Rimini Emilia-Romagna 1.054 1.014 0.880 1.156 0.706
Ragusa Sicilia 1.193 0.975 1.216 1.023 0.286 Piacenza Emilia-Romagna 1.036 1.002 0.919 1.124 0.708
Caserta Campania 0.922 1.002 0.983 0.939 0.325 Brescia Lombardia 1.129 1.014 0.986 1.131 0.711
Messina Sicilia 0.845 0.973 1.069 0.795 0.330 Ancona Marche 0.918 1.008 0.899 1.001 0.713
Siracusa Sicilia 0.940 1.007 1.231 0.760 0.331 Reggio nell'Emilia Emilia-Romagna 1.097 1.014 1.058 1.019 0.714
Campobasso Molise 0.959 1.051 1.147 0.811 0.337 Chieti Abruzzo 0.870 1.025 0.944 0.898 0.716
Nuoro Sardegna 0.516 0.982 1.230 0.460 0.359 Biella Piemonte 0.918 1.059 0.938 0.932 0.722
Foggia Puglia 0.722 1.006 0.981 0.721 0.403 Lecco Lombardia 1.031 1.016 0.869 1.162 0.732
Benevento Campania 0.803 0.992 1.186 0.698 0.408 Forlì-Cesena Emilia-Romagna 0.959 1.008 0.888 1.065 0.733
Avellino Campania 0.949 1.018 1.048 0.892 0.417 Parma Emilia-Romagna 1.204 0.994 1.012 1.195 0.734
Imperia Liguria 0.686 1.002 1.066 0.646 0.424 Treviso Veneto 1.038 1.013 0.989 1.031 0.734
Sassari Sardegna 0.885 0.981 1.186 0.757 0.439 Mantova Lombardia 1.042 1.013 0.914 1.126 0.738
Taranto Puglia 1.381 1.022 0.915 1.450 0.442 Valle d'Aosta Valle d'Aosta 1.123 0.986 1.035 1.082 0.742
Brindisi Puglia 0.763 1.009 1.042 0.735 0.444 Padova Veneto 1.021 1.005 0.971 1.041 0.743
Potenza Basilicata 1.052 0.989 1.267 0.824 0.456 Gorizia Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.863 1.011 0.918 0.937 0.744
Cagliari Sardegna 0.727 1.001 1.047 0.712 0.460 Verbano-Cusio-Ossola Piemonte 0.834 1.005 0.913 0.907 0.749
Salerno Campania 0.911 0.992 1.029 0.894 0.462 Massa-Carrara Toscana 0.956 1.041 1.145 0.815 0.754
Matera Basilicata 0.769 0.997 1.052 0.730 0.462 Bergamo Lombardia 1.053 1.008 0.932 1.117 0.759
Lecce Puglia 0.605 1.013 0.845 0.709 0.476 Novara Piemonte 0.975 1.020 0.992 0.959 0.764
Bari Puglia 0.826 1.020 1.024 0.796 0.493 Cremona Lombardia 1.052 0.991 0.798 1.330 0.768
Viterbo Lazio 0.833 0.995 0.977 0.856 0.501 Pistoia Toscana 1.024 1.032 0.982 1.013 0.776
Latina Lazio 0.999 1.022 0.990 0.981 0.508 Grosseto Toscana 0.933 0.981 0.962 0.987 0.776
Genova Liguria 1.000 1.005 1.009 0.984 0.514 Ravenna Emilia-Romagna 0.942 1.002 0.958 0.979 0.782
Rieti Lazio 0.799 1.019 1.307 0.655 0.521 Varese Lombardia 0.950 1.020 0.972 0.957 0.795
Frosinone Lazio 1.065 1.021 0.931 1.106 0.525 Cuneo Piemonte 1.047 1.007 0.993 1.048 0.797
Oristano Sardegna 0.894 0.991 0.514 1.843 0.530 Milano Lombardia 1.055 1.008 1.012 1.034 0.812
La Spezia Liguria 1.007 1.002 1.284 0.766 0.554 Bolzano/Bozen Trentino-Alto Adige 0.975 1.006 0.933 1.042 0.815
Pescara Abruzzo 0.779 0.999 1.278 0.611 0.593 Arezzo Toscana 1.144 1.028 0.955 1.161 0.819
Ascoli Piceno Marche 1.037 1.008 1.009 1.016 0.598 Prato Toscana 1.531 1.064 1.173 1.239 0.819
Savona Liguria 0.847 0.978 0.988 0.882 0.617 Lucca Toscana 1.232 1.024 1.191 1.008 0.829
Pordenone Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.946 0.999 0.978 0.969 0.627 Trento Trentino-Alto Adige 1.027 1.012 0.982 1.038 0.851
L'Aquila Abruzzo 0.636 0.983 0.980 0.672 0.628 Pisa Toscana 1.117 1.043 1.046 1.023 0.879
Belluno Veneto 0.963 1.001 0.980 0.976 0.633 Trieste Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1.023 1.010 0.831 1.203 0.897
Vercelli Piemonte 0.852 1.015 0.912 0.923 0.636 Livorno Toscana 2.001 1.042 1.336 1.394 0.898
Rovigo Veneto 0.904 0.992 0.889 1.018 0.644 Siena Toscana 0.970 0.993 0.966 1.001 0.900
Udine Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.902 1.003 1.004 0.895 0.651 Firenze Toscana 1.168 1.029 1.036 1.083 1.000
Ferrara Emilia-Romagna 0.861 1.011 0.949 0.893 0.659 Barletta-Andria-Trani Puglia 0.844 1.068 1.082 0.720 N/A
Torino Piemonte 0.953 1.011 1.006 0.936 0.661 Carbonia-Iglesias Sardegna 3.189 0.974 1.783 1.836 N/A
Verona Veneto 1.040 1.011 0.932 1.103 0.664 Fermo Marche 0.992 1.036 0.953 1.004 N/A
Pesaro e Urbino Marche 1.009 1.010 0.912 1.093 0.665 Medio Campidano Sardegna 0.670 0.938 0.969 0.737 N/A
Teramo Abruzzo 0.877 1.015 0.964 0.892 0.666 Monza e della Brianza Lombardia 1.040 1.013 1.000 1.024 N/A
Alessandria Piemonte 0.888 0.997 1.050 0.846 0.666 Ogliastra Sardegna 0.746 0.970 1.342 0.594 N/A
Pavia Lombardia 0.866 1.014 1.060 0.810 0.669 Olbia-Tempio Sardegna 0.477 1.027 1.051 0.443 N/A
Note: TFP is the Malmquist index; TECH is technological change; SE is scale efficiency change; PEFF is pure technical efficiency change; TFP=TECH x SE x PEFF. Figures for TFP, TECH, SE and PEFF
are geometric means, while those for IQI are arithmetic means. Percentage increases or decreases for each province and Malmquist component are obtained as (TFP-1)*100, (TECH-1)*100, (SE-1)*100
and (PEFF-1)*100. Provinces are sorted in ascending order of IQI. 
TABLE 2 - Malmquist index components and IQI by province in the period 2004-2011
FIGURE 2 – TFP change and IQI across the Italian provinces: 2004-2011 mean values 
 
 
FIGURE 3 – Technological efficiency change and IQI across the Italian provinces: 2004-2011 
mean values 
 
 
 FIGURE 4 – Scale efficiency change and IQI across the Italian provinces: 2004-2011 mean values 
 
 
FIGURE 5 – Pure efficiency change and IQI across the Italian provinces: 2004-2011 mean values 
 
TFP TECH SE PEFF TFP TECH SE PEFF TFP TECH SE PEFF TFP TECH SE PEFF TFP TECH SE PEFF
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
IQI 0.464*** -0.007 0.164*** 0.309*** 0.464*** -0.007 0.164*** 0.309*** 0.464*** -0.007 0.164*** 0.309*** 0.470*** -0.007 0.153** 0.307*** 0.374*** -0.011 0.150*** 0.184*
0.000 0.541 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.535 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.541 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.541 0.015 0.003 0.002 0.364 0.007 0.055
SIZE -0.391*** -0.009 1.159*** -2.695*** -0.385*** -0.009 1.158*** -2.693*** -0.391*** -0.009 1.159*** -2.695*** -0.389*** -0.009 1.160*** -2.696*** -0.397*** -0.009 1.156*** -2.690***
0.001 0.455 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.473 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.455 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.455 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.453 0.000 0.000
SIZE2 0.022*** 0.001 -0.085*** 0.176*** 0.021*** 0.001 -0.085*** 0.176*** 0.022*** 0.001 -0.085*** 0.176*** 0.022*** 0.001 -0.085*** 0.176*** 0.022*** 0.001 -0.085*** 0.175***
0.002 0.343 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.343 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.343 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.346 0.000 0.000
AGE -0.062*** -0.001 -0.005 -0.049*** -0.234* -0.014 0.023 -0.132 -0.062*** -0.001 -0.005 -0.049*** -0.062*** -0.001 -0.005 -0.049*** -0.059*** 0.000 -0.002 -0.048***
0.000 0.712 0.486 0.000 0.098 0.357 0.749 0.245 0.000 0.712 0.486 0.000 0.000 0.712 0.507 0.000 0.000 0.814 0.764 0.000
INDEBT 0.006*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.005***
0.000 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.149 0.000 0.000
CASHFLOW 0.026*** 0.000 0.001 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.000 0.001 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.000 0.001 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.000 0.001 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.000 0.001 0.024***
0.000 0.778 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.737 0.162 0.000 0.000 0.778 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.778 0.168 0.000 0.000 0.783 0.139 0.000
HHI -0.023 0.007 0.007 0.118 -0.024 0.007 0.007 0.117 -0.023 0.007 0.007 0.118 -0.024 0.007 0.007 0.119 -0.021 0.007 0.003 0.122
0.853 0.538 0.901 0.212 0.848 0.542 0.899 0.213 0.853 0.538 0.901 0.212 0.850 0.538 0.902 0.208 0.866 0.540 0.960 0.198
GDPPC 0.146 -0.002 -0.047 0.173* 0.148 -0.002 -0.047 0.174* 0.146 -0.002 -0.047 0.173* 0.118 -0.002 -0.038 0.171* 0.186 -0.001 -0.039 0.187**
0.214 0.833 0.371 0.051 0.208 0.842 0.368 0.050 0.214 0.833 0.371 0.051 0.291 0.833 0.471 0.052 0.104 0.916 0.347 0.017
DENSITY 0.085*** 0.000 0.022** 0.045** 0.085*** 0.000 0.022** 0.045** 0.085*** 0.000 0.022** 0.045** 0.089*** 0.000 0.020** 0.053*** 0.069*** 0.000 0.015* 0.029*
0.002 0.924 0.031 0.010 0.002 0.926 0.031 0.010 0.002 0.924 0.031 0.010 0.001 0.924 0.047 0.002 0.005 0.808 0.082 0.061
JACOB 0.003* 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.003* 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.003* 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.003* 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.003** 0.000 0.001* 0.000
0.096 0.645 0.077 0.710 0.099 0.631 0.076 0.703 0.096 0.645 0.077 0.710 0.095 0.645 0.070 0.733 0.046 0.697 0.058 0.964
PATENT -0.029 0.001 -0.034*** -0.003 -0.029 0.001 -0.034*** -0.003 -0.029 0.001 -0.034*** -0.003 -0.026 0.001 -0.034*** -0.004 -0.027 0.001 -0.029*** 0.003
0.161 0.677 0.001 0.842 0.162 0.666 0.001 0.845 0.161 0.677 0.001 0.842 0.197 0.677 0.001 0.823 0.169 0.696 0.001 0.869
R&D 0.024 0.001 -0.009 0.031 0.025 0.001 -0.009 0.031 0.024 0.001 -0.009 0.031 0.025 0.001 -0.009 0.031 0.066* 0.003 0.015 0.071**
0.558 0.685 0.636 0.336 0.546 0.670 0.631 0.330 0.558 0.685 0.636 0.336 0.532 0.685 0.625 0.326 0.094 0.398 0.377 0.017
AGE2 0.025 0.002 -0.004 0.012
0.221 0.373 0.694 0.464
CRISIS 0.044* -0.045*** 0.141*** -0.030
0.056 0.000 0.000 0.168
Observations 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151
Model test 1382.8 13422.5 3856.4 2638.4 1384.4 13423.5 3856.4 2639.3 1382.8 13422.5 3856.4 2638.4 1383.4 13422.5 3852.1 2641.2 1417.8 13424.9 3923.6 2686.1
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
For the description of the variables see Table 1. Superscripts ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. In italics are reported the p-values of the tests. The variables SIZE, AGE,
GDPPC, DENSITY, PATENT and R&D are in natural logarithms.
Mundlack correction
TABLE 3 - Estimation results
BENCH Adding AGE2 in BENCH Dummy CRISIS in BENCH Random coefficient
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
CORR 0.086 0.005 -0.064 0.012
0.499 0.683 0.545 0.857
GOV 0.147 -0.018 0.178 0.092
0.277 0.183 0.121 0.185
REG 0.158* 0.010 0.099 0.054
0.069 0.246 0.177 0.223
RUL 0.311*** -0.008 0.225*** 0.088**
0.000 0.270 0.001 0.036
VOI -0.012 0.006 -0.127 -0.023
0.933 0.513 0.210 0.713
SIZE -0.387*** -0.387*** -0.391*** -0.391*** -0.387*** -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -2.693*** -2.692*** -2.695*** -2.699*** -2.694*** 1.161*** 1.162*** 1.160*** 1.159*** 1.161***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.452 0.446 0.436 0.470 0.455 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE2 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.176*** -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.085***
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.341 0.336 0.327 0.354 0.342 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AGE -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.720 0.732 0.736 0.700 0.715 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.483 0.473 0.482 0.509 0.487
INDEBT 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.116 0.131 0.116 0.119 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CASHFLOW 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.775 0.787 0.777 0.771 0.782 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.170 0.172 0.173 0.163 0.169
HHI -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.027 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.113 0.115 0.116 0.116 0.113 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006
0.837 0.838 0.834 0.835 0.833 0.525 0.537 0.515 0.533 0.524 0.231 0.224 0.221 0.221 0.230 0.912 0.912 0.913 0.904 0.913
GDPPC 0.286** 0.282** 0.228* 0.304*** 0.314** -0.005 -0.002 -0.010 -0.005 -0.009 0.306*** 0.255*** 0.230*** 0.293*** 0.350*** 0.012 -0.002 -0.016 0.020 0.028
0.016 0.016 0.054 0.006 0.012 0.499 0.766 0.259 0.477 0.381 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.827 0.965 0.769 0.699 0.647
DENSITY 0.085*** 0.071** 0.084*** 0.095*** 0.077*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.031* 0.043** 0.050*** 0.041** 0.020 0.015 0.022** 0.025** 0.020*
0.007 0.016 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.665 0.597 0.534 0.943 0.982 0.138 0.083 0.016 0.004 0.019 0.113 0.152 0.042 0.027 0.071
JACOB 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003* 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001
0.105 0.105 0.121 0.074 0.100 0.680 0.625 0.698 0.619 0.701 0.629 0.621 0.577 0.747 0.579 0.103 0.101 0.109 0.077 0.103
PATENT -0.017 -0.020 -0.017 -0.016 -0.014 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.009 -0.002 0.006 0.007 0.004 -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.030***
0.429 0.356 0.398 0.443 0.490 0.899 0.400 0.834 0.771 0.625 0.606 0.906 0.746 0.684 0.813 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.005
R&D 0.046 0.046 0.059 0.027 0.048 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.047 0.046 0.052* 0.028 0.050 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.009 0.000
0.268 0.267 0.151 0.518 0.246 0.749 0.728 0.630 0.610 0.782 0.137 0.150 0.100 0.378 0.110 0.975 0.969 0.925 0.668 0.997
Observations 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151 42,151
Model test 1365.9 1366.3 1371.0 1382.1 1365.2 13422.2 13424.3 13423.7 13423.6 13422.5 2625.2 2627.4 2630.6 2643.0 2630.4 3840.9 3844.3 3847.3 3844.4 3839.3
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
For the description of the variables see Table 1. Superscripts ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. In italics are reported the p-values of the tests. The variables SIZE, AGE,
GDPPC, DENSITY, PATENT and R&D are in natural logarithms.
TABLE 4 - Estimation results: decomposing IQI
TFP TECH SE PEFF
